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Federal District Court in Puerto Rico: A Brief
Look at the Court and Federal Handling of
Commonwealth Civil Law in Diversity Cases
by David C. Indiano*
W HEN THE UNITED States Constitution was ratified, authorizing
the creation of a federal court system, neither Puerto Rico nor Loui-
siana, with their civil law traditions, were yet a part of the United States.'
Nevertheless, the common-law based U.S. federal court system can and
does assume jurisdiction over cases applying the civil law of Puerto Rico
and Louisiana.2 Given the common-law tradition this country inherited
from England, it is unlikely that the framers anticipated the interpreta-
tion of civil law' by these courts. Yet, since the Erie doctrine was first
applied, the federal courts in both Puerto Rico and Louisiana have been
forced to apply civil law.
The purpose of this inquiry is to explore how the federal district
court in Puerto Rico has handled the situation. Unlike Louisiana, Puerto
Rico varies drastically from the continental states in many ways beyond
its civil law system. It is a Spanish speaking territory which is dominated
by an hispanic culture.4 Allegience to the United States is strained and
the political status of the island is in question with every gubernatorial
election.5 But these cultural and political factors only augment the diffi-
* Case Western Reserve University School of Law, J.D. candidate 1981.
The Louisiana Purchase was acquired twelve years after the Constitution was adopted
(1803), while Puerto Rico was not acquired until over a century later, following the Spanish
American War (1898) and did not achieve Commonwealth status until 1952.
2 See Erie Railroad v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
3 References to "civil law" include generally, the "Roman law" and "civil codes."
4 Of the 2,659,241 residents of Puerto Rico considered "native," only 483,673 speak
English and even that figure is deceptive since English is the most common second lan-
guage, see 1 U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, CHARACTERISTICS OF THE POPULATION pt. 53 (1970).
Although the language data is still unavailable for 1980, the U.S. Census reports that the
population has increased to 3,187,570, see U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, 1980 CENSUS OF
POPULATION AND HOUSING, PRELIMINARY REPORT pt. 53 (1981).
6 Puerto Rico politics were dominated from 1940 through 1968 by the Popular Demo-
cratic Party (Partido Popular Democritico-PPD) of former Governor Luis Mufioz Marin,
the principal architect of "Operation Bootstrap" and of the Commonwealth relationship
with the United States. While demands for Puerto Rican independence declined sharply
after 1952, a substantial movement favoring statehood continued under the leadership of
Luis A. Ferr6 and others. In a 1967 plebiscite, 60.4 percent opted for continued common-
wealth status, 39 percent for statehood, and 0.6 percent for independence. Following shifts
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culties which face this particular District Court. The application of civil
law in diversity suits raises a series of questions which this note will
identify.
I. INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND TO THE FEDERAL DISTRICT COURT IN
PUERTO Rico
On Dec. 10, 1898 Spain and the United States signed the Treaty of
Paris ending the Spanish-American War.s Under Article II of the Treaty,
"Spain cedes to the United States the island of Porto Rico . . . ." The
first American sponsored court in Puerto Rico was established two days
before the signing of this treaty when General Henry ordered the creation
of a new Military Commission while the American military was allegedly
acting under a protocol entitled a "Basis for Establishment of Peace."
The establishment of this court has been criticized both for its possible
lack of authority and as "the worst example of despotic power."'
The military court was short-lived and General Davis (General
Henry's successor) ordered the creation of the Provisional Court of the
in party alignments in advance of the 1968 election, Ferr6 was elected to the governorship as
head of the New Progressive Party (Partido Nuevo Progresista-PNP), which also gained a
small majority in the House of Representatives, although the PPD retained tenuous control
of the Senate. Four years later, the PPD, under Rafael Hernfindez Col6n, regained the gov-
ernorship and full control of the legislature. In 1976, however, the pro-statehood PNP,
under San Juan Mayor Carlos Romero Barcel6, upset the PPD, sweeping both legislative
houses.
The traditionally anti-statehood PPD officially boycotted the October 22, 1978 primary
for selection of twenty-two delegates to the U.S. Democratic Party national convention, but
a party faction composed of the pro-statehood Americans for Democratic Action (ADA), and
styling itself the New Democratic Party on the ballot, easily won. With PPD head Her-
nfndez Col6n having been succeeded in July by Miguel Hernfndez Agosto, and despite oc-
togenarian Mufioz Main's return to politics as an advocate for continued commonwealth
status, "statehooders" thus held control, for the first time, of both the PPD and the PNP,
see POLrrcAL HANDBOOK OF THE WORLD 1980 at 497-98 (A. Banks ed. 1980).
Before the 1980 gubernatorial election, it had been expected that Gov. Romero Barcel6
would call for a plebiscite on statehood in 1981 should he be reelected. But the campaign
was clouded by an array of other issues which led to one of the closest contests in Puerto
Rican history. Although the Governor survived the election, it is unlikely that such a plebi-
scite will take place in the near future. For election results, see El Mundo (Puerto Rico),
Jan. 2, 1981, at 6-B, col. 1.
" See Treaty of Paris, Dec. 10, 1898, United States-Spain, 30 Stat. 1754, T.S. No. 343,
11 U.S.T. 615.
Id. 11 U.S.T, at 616.
8 Id. at 613. See also Tschudin, The United States District Court For The District of
Puerto Rico: Can an English court serve the interest of justice in a Spanish language
society? 37 REV. C. ABo. P. R. 41, 42 (1976).
I See Delgado Cintr6n, El Tribunal Federal Como Factor de Transculturaci6n en
Puerto Rico, 34 REv. C. ABo. P. R. 1, 12-16 (1973).
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United States for the Department of Puerto Rico.10 Upon inauguration of
the Court, its chief architect declared that "[tihis installation of the High
Federal Court is the greatest step taken thus far by the country on its
road to Americanization." 1 Again, the authority of this court has been
questioned as well as the fundamental premise that Puerto Rico was in
need of Americanization. 2
Like its predecessor, the life span of this Court was brief. It was
superceded when Congress approved the Organic Act of April 12, 1900
(The Foraker Act)18 to "temporarily provide revenues and a civil govern-
ment for Porto Rico [sic], and for other purposes. ' '1 ' Section 34 of this act
discontinued the Provisional Court and created the District Court of the
United States for Puerto Rico which would have, "in addition to the ordi-
nary jurisdiction of district courts of the United States, jurisdiction of all
cases cognizant in the circuit courts of the United States." 15 Moreover,
this section required that "[a]ll pleadings and proceedings in said court
shall be conducted in the English language."'" This latter requirement
has remained through out the history of this particular court despite the
fact that the language of Puerto Rico is not English. Sixty-five years after
the creation of the District Court (and in response to a request that the
Supreme Court of Puerto Rico similarly conduct its proceedings in
English) the Supreme Court of Puerto Rico stated:
It is a fact not subject to historical rectification that the vehicle of ex-
pression, the language of the Puerto Rican people-integral part of our
origin and of our hispanic culture-has been and continues to be Span-
ish .... [T]he means of expression of our people is Spanish and that is a
reality that cannot be changed by any law."
The Jones Act (Organic Act of 1917),18 significantly modified the
jurisdiction of the federal court. Section five of the Act made Puerto Ri-
cans U.S. citizens" and section 41 of the Act granted the Court general
jurisdiction as well as special jurisdiction when the matter in controversy
10 Delgado Cintr6n, supra at 22; Tschudin, supra note 8, at 43.
" Delgado Cintr6n, supra at 22.
Is Delgado Cintrbn, supra at 22; See also Torres, The Puerto Rico Penal Code of 1902-
1975: A Case Study of American Legal Imperialism, 45 REv. JuR. U.P.R. 1, 49-57 (1976).
"8 31 Stat. 84 (1900); Puerto Rican Federal Relations Act, §9, 64 Stat. 319 (1950); P.R.
LAWs ANN. Hist. Doc., at 26.
14 Id.
" §34, 31 Stat. at 45-46.
16 Id.
7 People v. Superior Court, 92 P.R.R. 580, 588-89 (1965). For a more complete analysis
of this dilema, see Tschudin, supra note 8.
I8 39 Stat. 951 (1917).
"9 §5, 39 Stat. at 953.
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exceeded $3000 and the parties were not domiciled in Puerto Rico.20 This
type of case could be brought regardless of whether there was diversity of
citizenship, or whether the parties were aliens.2 Finally, section 42 reiter-
ated the English language requirement and stated that this district court
will be governed by the same rules as govern all other federal district
courts.22
The territory of Puerto Rico officially became the Commonwealth of
Puerto Rico in 1952.28 Section 1332(b) of Title 28 of the United States
Code had previously included Puerto Rico under the heading of "terri-
tory" and there was some confusion as to whether the island was still
included within this definition of diversity jurisdiction.24 For this reason,
the section was amended to provide that the Commonwealth of Puerto
Rico be treated as a state for purposes of district court diversity
jurisdiction.2
II. MECHANICS OF THE COURT
Generally, the jurisdiction and procedure of the District Court for
Puerto Rico are similar to other federal district courts. Final judgments
are appealable. Review of such judgments of the District Court was in-
tially assigned to the First Circuit Court of Appeals in 1915. An exclusive
right of direct review to the United States Supreme Court from this
Court and the Supreme Court of Puerto Rico was granted in 1961.26 In
1948, Congress included the District Court within the meaning of "dis-
trict courts of the United States.' 7 Congress, in a report by the Judiciary
Committee of the House of Representatives, addressed the issue of juris-
diction and stated that "Hawaii and Puerto Rico are included as judicial
districts of the United States, since in matters of jurisdiction, powers, and
20 §41, 39 Stat. at 965.
21 48 U.S.C. §863 (1964). See also Leibowitz, The Applicability of Federal Law to the
Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, 37 REv. JUR. U.P.R. 615, 647 (1968), which explains that
this jurisdiction originated in order to permit mainland cases to be tried in courts familiar
with the problems of the litigants and in a context with which the disputants are familiar.
This jurisdiction was retained in the Puerto Rican Federal Relations Act, 72 Stat. 415
(1958).
"' §42, 39 Stat. at 966.
23 P. R. LAW ANN. Hist. Doc., at 136-49.
24 28 U.S.C. §1332(b) (1964), as amended by Act of Congress of July 26, 1956, Pub. L.
No. 808, 20 Stat. 658. For legislative history, see H.R. REP. No. 2481, S. REP. No. 2605, 84th
Cong., 2d Sess. 2, reprinted in (1956) U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 3557-59. See also
Detras v. Lions Building Corp., 136 F. Supp. 699 (D.P.R. 1955).
5 d.
20 See Garcia-Passalacqua, The Judicial Process and the Status of Puerto Rico, 30
REv. JUR. U.P.R. 14, 154 (1961).
27 Id.
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procedure, they are in all respects equal to other United States district
courts."28 The First Circuit Court of Appeals has interpreted this to mean
that: "Congress was intent on raising [these courts] on a parity with the
other federal district courts and deriving their authority from the same
statutory source from which all district courts in the federal judicial sys-
tem receive their powers."' 9
Although the status of the civil law in Puerto Rico is the next topic
of discussion, two points should be mentioned here which relate to the
mechanics of the Court. First, since judges on this Court now tend to be
Puerto Ricans schooled in the civilist tradition, their natural respect for
the integrity of statutory law and its literal interpretation, cannot be
ignored.8 0 This respect is an internal mechanism which regulates court
action.
Second, when applying Puerto Rican law, the District Court has
power under Article 7 of the Puerto Rican Civil Code of 1902 to explicitly
resort to supplementary sources of law when it feels the need to "fill a
gap (lacunae, non-existent provisions). 3 1 This is analogous to the law-
equity merger in the federal courts. Specifically, the Code states "when
there is no law applicable to the case, the court shall decide in accordance
with equity, which means that natural reason, as embodied in the general
principles of the Law, and established usages and customs, shall be taken
into consideration."8 The next section will elaborate on how these mech-
anisms affect the law in a substantive manner.
III. STATUS OF CrnIL LAW IN PUERTO Rico AT THE TIME OF THE
INCEPTION OF THE COMMONWEALTH (1952)
The Spanish Civil Code was extended to the islands of Puerto Rico,
Cuba and the Phillippines by Royal Decree on July 31, 1889 and took
effect in Puerto Rico on January 1, 1890. 8 The Code was first incorpo-
rated by the American military when:
[I]n General Orders, No. 1, Oct. 18, 1898, the Military Governor provided
that the provincial and municipal laws, in so far as they affected the set-
tlement of the private rights of person and property and provided for the
punishment of crime, would be enforced unless they were incompatible
" Quoted in Miranda v. U.S., 266 F.2d 9, 14 (1st Cir. 1958).
21 Id. at 14-15. See also Americana of Puerto Rico v. Kaplus, 240 F. Supp. 854 (D.N.J.
1965).
See Torres, supra note 12, at 41.
81 See Nickles, Problems of Sources of Law Relationships Under the Uniform Com-
mercial Code - Part I: The Methodological Problem and its Civil Law Approach, 31 ARK. L.
R. 1, 25-26 (1977).
31 P.R. Civ. CODE art. 7 (1902). See also Nickles, supra note 31, at 25-26.
83 31 P.R. LAws ANN. §1, 364-65. See also Torres v. Rubianes, 20 P.R.R. 316 (1914).
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with the changed conditions in Puerto Rico, in which event they might
be suspended by the department commander and that they would be ad-
ministered substantially as they were before the cession to the United
States."4
The first post Spanish-American War code was adopted in 1902. Between
1911 and 1941, there were various compilations, editions and supplements
promulgated which provide the primary grounding for the present Puerto
Rican Civil Code.3'
Decisions rendered by the Spanish courts can still affect the con-
struction of the Code. Marchan v. Eguen36 held that when the Puerto
Rican legislature adopted the Civil Code of Spain, it accepted the con-
struction placed upon it by the Spanish courts. Judgments rendered by
the Supreme Court of Spain prior to October 18, 1898, construing the
Spanish Civil Code then in-force in Puerto Rico are binding on the courts
of Puerto Rico while those rendered after that date have no legal force
except to the extent that they offer well-reasoned possible solutions to a
particular problem."7 Additionally, it has been held that "in accordance
with a well-established rule of legal interpretation, this [Puerto Rican]
court may refer to eminent Spanish commentators for the proper inter-
pretation of such parts of the Civil Code of Puerto Rico as have been
copied literally from the Spanish Civil Code."8
But Spain is not the only jurisdiction whose jurisprudence is influen-
tial in Puerto Rico. The Preface to the 1930 edition of The Civil Code
contains the following passage:
[J]udges and lawyers may ... consider as it may be necessary, the juris-
prudence of our Supreme Court applicable to each section, and in cases,
for example, of provisions already existing in the Spanish Civil Code, or
which were brought to our Civil Code from the Civil Code of Louisiana,
the construction given to said provisions by the magistrates of the re-
spective country."9
Thus, when interpreting the Puerto Rican Code's language, the Louisiana
Code will be similarly respected for its contributions to the Puerto Rican
Code.
Underlying these code adaptations was a political struggle which
must be mentioned. Puerto Rico was acquired during America's imperial
period. The United States was "bursting into the twentieth century as a
34 31 P.R. LAws ANN. §1, 364-65.
85 Id. at 365-70. These revisions are dealt with in the section of the code entitled "His-
tory of the Civil Code."
8 44 P.R.R. 396 (1933).
" See Olivieri v. Biaggi, 17 P.R.R. 676 (1911).
" See Bonillerse v. GonzAlez, 17 P.R.R. 1084 (1911).
n 31 P.R. LAws ANN. §1, 364 at 366.
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modern industrialized nation with impressive technological leadership,
searching for profitable markets for its products and surplus capital."4
With nationalism on the rise, a resurgence of manifest destiny, character-
ized by paternalism, was evident. Upon his landing in Puerto Rica, the
American General Miles brought the following message to the Island:
In the prosecution of the war against the kingdom of Spain by the people
of the United States in the cause of liberty, justice, and humanity, its
military forces have come to occupy the island of Puerto Rico... They
bring you the fostering arm of a nation of free people, whose greatest
power is in its justice and humanity to all those living within its
fold .... We have not come to make war upon the people of a country
that for centuries has been oppressed, but, on the contrary, to bring you
protection, not only to yourselves but to your property, to promote your
prosperity, and bestow upon you the immunities and blessings of the lib-
eral institutions of our government. It is not our purpose to interfere
with any existing laws and customs that are wholesome and beneficial to
your people so long as they conform to the rules of military administra-
tion of order and justice. This is not a war of devastation, but one to give
to all within the control of its military and naval forces the advantages
and blessings of enlightened civilization.4
Although the Civil Code eventually emerged in substantially the same
form as when it was extended to Puerto Rico under the Spanish regime,42
this U.S. paternalism did exert certain pressure during the ensuing legal
reconstruction which followed the war.
In 1898, five basic laws were present in Puerto Rico: (1) The Spanish
Civil Code of 1898; (2) The Spanish Code of Commerce of 1885; (3) The
Spanish Penal Code of 1870; (4) The Spanish Law of Civil Procedure of
1855; and (5) The Spanish Law of Criminal Procedure of 1872." The
Foraker Act sought to harmonize these Spanish Codes with Anglo-Ameri-
can Law. Section 40 of this Act requires that:
[A] commission, to consist of three members, at least one of whom shall
be a native citizen of Puerto Rico, shall be appointed by the President,
by and with the advice and consent of the Senate to compile and revise
the laws of Puerto Rico also the various codes of procedure and systems
of municipal government now in force, and to frame and report such leg-
islation as may be necessary to make a simple, harmonious and economi-
cal government, establish justice and secure its prompt and efficient ad-
ministration ... And said commission shall make full and final report,
in both the English and Spanish languages, of all its revisions, compila-
40 See Torres, supra note 12, at 49.
1 See Rodriguez Ramos, Interaction of Civil Law and Anglo-American Law in the
Legal Method in Puerto Rico, 23 TUL. L. R. 1, 3-4 (1949).
42 Id. at 20.
" Id. at 5.
1981
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tions, and recommendations, with explanatory notes as to the changes
and the reasons therefor, to the Congress on or before one year after the
passage of this act."
The goals of the commission established under this act were patently un-
realistic. Within a period of seven months, two Americans and one Puerto
Rican were expected to lay the foundations for harmonizing the differ-
ences between the Civil Law and the Anglo-American law in Puerto
Rico.4 6 Even under ideal conditions, such a harmonization within these
time constraints would have been nearly impossible.
Furthermore, there were other serious problems. First, many drastic
and sudden changes in the structure of the law would jeopardize popular
respect for the law. Second, there was deep resentment of the idea that
the Puerto Ricans were not themselves competent to revise and adapt
their codes if the new conditions so required. 46
Fortunately, the report issued by the commission urged a policy of
gradual harmonization to be worked out by the Legislative Assembly of
Puerto Rico.' 7 Subsequently, this did become the goal of the Legisla-
ture.4 8 It is for this reason that the Civil Code emerged largely intact.4"
When examining the status of codes in civil and common law sys-
tems, important distinctions as to sources of law must be made. As Dean
Rodriguez Ramos has succinctly stated:
For the civilian, written texts are the primary source of positive law. On
the other hand, as stated by Paton, "in England statutes are a gloss writ-
ten around the common law," and as Pound has put it:
According to the orthodox view of our law a statute is something
exceptional, something introduced into the general body of the
common law without any necessary or systematic relation
thereto, in order to meet some special situation, and hence gov-
erning that situation only.
The continental codes state the law comprehensively in general princi-
ples. Civil law codes and statutes are the same in form and enactment.
On the other hand, in the common law world a statute, "unless declara-
tory of the common law, gives only a rule," so that "statutes in deroga-
tion of the common law are to be construed strictly. 50
In contrast, the general rule in the civil law system is that judicial deci-
31 Stat. 84 (1900). See also Rodriguez Ramos, supra note 41, at 13-14.
" See also Rodriguez Ramos, supra note 41, at 13-14.
See Rodriguez Ramos, supra note 41, at 13-14.
47 See Rodriguez Ramos, supra note 41, at 13-14.
48 See Rodriguez Ramos, supra note 41, at 17 and 18.
41 See Rodriguez Ramos, supra note 41, at 25 and 37. Rodriguez Ramos provides an
excellent discussion of the concept of "codes" under the two legal systems.
" See Rodriguez Ramos, supra note 41, at 345.
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sions do not constitute a primary source of law, but only a gloss on the
law.51
Although a more elaborate discussion of the fundamental differences
between the two systems is not within the scope of this note,5" Puerto
Rico's particular approach to this contradiction is relevant. The legisla-
ture of Puerto Rico has made it clear that its will is not to be ignored."
Although Legislation is the primary source of law, Puerto Rico has not
totally embraced the civil law tradition. On the contrary, it must be
remembered that only two of the five codes enforced in the Island are
true continental codes, the other three are Anglo-American."
Looking again to Dean Rodriguez Ramos' evaluation of the pre-1949
situation, a few points should be reiterated. At almost every opportunity,
the Supreme Court of Puerto Rico emphatically states its adherence to
the written law contained in the codes or statutes and asserts that it is
notin the business of judicial legislation.5 ' Yet this is not universally ap-
plied. The Court has made policy decisions." Also, there are a number of
exceptional cases which ignore the written law without expressly pro-
claiming judicial power to disregard statutory law.'7 There are also in-
stances in which the court cites codes and statutes, but gives the impres-
sion of not being certain whether the written law alone constitutues a
sufficiently reliable authority upon which to base a decision. Here, it is
not unusual for the Supreme Court of Puerto Rico to support the quoted
provisions of a statute with judicial decisions, either local or from states
where similar statutes exist.'6 Nor is it unusual to see the court utilize
See Rodriguez Ramos, supra note 41, at 346.
6, For an overview of the differences between the two systems, see See Rodriguez Ra-
mos, supra note 41, at 346 and 351.
03 See Rodriguez Ramos, supra note 41, at 351. The following pertinent provisions of
the Civil Code of Puerto Rico, quoted in Rodriguez Ramos, supra note 41, leave no doubt
that the legislature intended for its will to prevail:
Article 5. - Laws are repealed only by means of subsequent laws; and disuse,
custom or practice to the contrary shall not prevail against the observance thereof.
Article 7. - When no law exists applicable to the case at issue, the court shall
decide in accordance with equity, which means that natural reason according to
the general principles of law, and accepted and established usages and customs,
shall be taken into consideration.
Article 12. - In matters which are the subject of special laws, deficiencies in
such laws shall be supplied by the provisions of this Code.
Article 21. - The distinction of laws into odious or favorable with a view of
limiting or extending their provisions, shall not be made by those whose duty it is
to interpret them.
, See Rodriguez Ramos, supra note 41, at 352.
See Rodriguez Ramos, supra note 41, at 352.
See Rodriguez Ramos, supra note 41, at 352.
' See Rodriguez Ramos, supra note 41, at 353.
See Rodriguez Ramos, supra note 41, at 354-55.
1981
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Latin maxims borrowed from the Anglo-American system. 9
Stare decisis, a clearly rejected doctrine in most civil law countries,
has some place in Puerto Rico. Almost since its creation, the Supreme
Court of Puerto Rico has held itself bound by its own decision, although
not absolutely so.60 Moreover, the decisions of the Supreme Court of the
United States are ultimately binding on the insular courts. 1
At the pre-Commonwealth juncture in which Dean Ramos was writ-
ing, legal method was in a state of indecision. His suggestion was that,
although there was a need for reformulation of Puerto Rico's written law
and revision of their methods of interpretation, there was no need for
"slavish loyalty to any one legal system." 6
One way that Puerto Rico has dealt with the intermingling of these
two legal systems is through its "equity" jurisdiction. It should be noted
that "equity" is a development of the common law, not meant for inclu-
sion in a civilian system; but the concept of equity is a necessary aspect
of any legal system, be it common law or civil law." Although a civil law
judge must generally decide according to written law, where true "gaps"
exist, equity may be called upon to fill the vacuum.
Article 7 of the Puerto Rican Civil Code" dealing with supplemen-
tary sources of law was derived from the codes of Spain and Louisiana.
Article 21 of the Louisiana Civil Code states:
[I]n all civil matters, where there is no express law, the judge is bound to
proceed and decide according to equity. To decide equitably, an appeal is
to be made to natural law and reason, or received usages, where positive
law is silent."'
Article 6 of the Civil Code of Spain states:
Any court which refuses to render judgment on the pretext of silence,
obscurity or insufficiency of the law, shall incur liability therefor. When
there is no law exactly applicable to the point in controversy, the cus-
toms of the place shall be observed, and in the absence thereof, the gen-
eral principles of the Law.66
The Supreme Court of Puerto Rico has held that Article 7 applies to both
" See Rodriguez Ramos, supra note 41, at 356.
6" See Rodriguez Ramos, supra note 41, at 361.
6" See Rodriguez Ramos, supra note 41, at 362.
See Rodriguez Ramos, supra note 41, at 367.
See Rodriguez Ramos, "Equity" in the Civil Law: A Comparative Essay, 44 TUL. L.
R. 720, 739 (1969-1970).
P. R. CIv. CODE art. 7. See also Nickles, supra note 31, at 25-26.
*8 LA. Civ. CODE ANN. art, 21 (West). For elaboration, see Rodriguez Ramos, supra note
63, at 722-23.
" SPAIN CIV. CODE art. 6 (1870). See also Rodriguez Ramos, supra note 63, at 722-23.
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procedural and substantive issues."
The blending of the Spanish and Louisiana codes was pursuant to a
recommendation of the Revision Commission which had been established
by the Foraker Act. The blending has resulted in considerable confusion.
Dean Rodriguez Ramos has suggested that it is but another example of
the Commission's hasty evaluation of the legal needs in Puerto Rico at
the turn of the century. 8 For example, when referring to the "law appli-
cable," the Puerto Rican Code does not use either the term "exactly," as
in the Spanish Code, or "express," as in the Louisiana Code, to modify
the phrase. Writers have queried whether this omission is significant to
Puerto Rican jurisprudence but no clear cut answer exists.
Another problem is the use of the term "equity" within the provision.
Equity is not a concept whose use can only be made "when there is no
law applicable to the case," as prescribed in Article 7 but rather:
[E]quity is an element of interpretation which serves the purpose of
preventing a rigid application of a general norm in a singular case, when
such an application of the norm might give rise to an injustice. The con-
cept of equity may be used even in the construction of what may seem to
be a clear statute. Its use cannot be limited to the cases in which "gen-
eral principles of the law," or "usages and customs," are to be "taken
into consideration," for it can also be used when there is a law applicable
to the case.60
Although Article 14 of this same Code provides that "[w]hen a law is
clear and free from all ambiguity, the letter of it is not to be disregarded,
under the pretext of pursuing its spirit," the converse is also true.70 Thus,
this provision has a potential for rigidity which could undermine the
effectiveness of equity jurisdiction in Puerto Rico.
Before concluding this discussion of the status of the civil law in
Puerto Rico at the inception of the Commonwealth, a few comments
should be made regarding available sources of law. As in Spain, the uni-
versal sources of law are, in order, statutes, customs and general princi-
ples of law.71 This order has been accepted by the Puerto Rico Supreme
Court despite the juxtaposition of the last two concepts within Article 7
of the Puerto Rican Code.72 In addition, stare decisis, as accepted by the
Island's Supreme Court, provides a fourth source. Finally, the writings of
67 See Lpez Zrate v. Villabasso, 12 P.R.R. 52 (1907); Robles v. Ostalaza, 96 P.R.R.
570 (1968).
Rodriguez Ramos, supra note 63, at 731.
60 Rodriguez Ramos, supra note 63, at 734-35.
70 P.R. CIv. Cons art. 14. See also Rodriguez Ramos, supra 63, at 734-35.
71 Rodriguez Ramos, supra note 63, at 735.
11 Rodriguez Ramos, supra note 63, at 735. See also Nickles, supra note 31 and related
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Spain's most outstanding commentators provide a fifth source.7"
This overview of the civil law's evolution in Puerto Rico has been
largely from the perspective of the insular courts. But a federal district
court necessarily has other loyalties within the American legal system.
The crucial inquiry is whether, in light of the legal sources and traditions
it must follow, the federal district court will ignore the common law as a
,potential source for substantive law? Without purporting to suggest a
conclusive answer, a look at some of the court's decisions during the past
two decades might prove helpful.
IV. THE FEDERAL DISTRICT COURT'S DEALING WITH THE COMMON LAW
When the court faces a diversity suit, it has a range of options ex-
tending from outright rejection to complete acceptance of common law
doctrine.
A. Rejection of the Common Law
Matter of Daben Corp.7 * was a bankruptcy proceeding involving a
merchandiser of children's wear (debtor) and a department store operator
(creditor). In deciding an alternate holding for the case, the Court con-
fronted the issue of whether a license agreement constituted a lease under
the Civil Code of Puerto Rico and was thus entitled to priority in bank-
ruptcy proceedings. The old Federal Bankruptcy Act7" acknowledged pri-
ority status to creditors only where the landlord-creditor was entitled to
priority under state law (here, Puerto Rico).7 ' It is important to under-
stand that these "lease" arrangements in department stores are quite
common and readily accepted in the United States.77 The court held that
such an arrangement was not subject to priority status under Puerto Ri-
can law and cited the relevant statutes.
With regard to specified personal property of the debtor, the follow-
ing are preferred:
(7) Credits for rents and leases for one year With regard to the personal
property of the lessee existing on the estate leased and on the fruits
thereof.
78
Immediately thereafter, the Court noted that this statute, by its own
73 See Rodriguez Ramos, supra note 63, at 735.
"' 469 F. Supp. 135 (D.P.R. 1979).
78 11 U.S.C. §§64(a)(5), 104(a)(5) (1967). Similar provisions now found in The Bank-
ruptcy Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, §§502(b) 7, 507, 92 Stat. 2549.
71 Id. See 31 P. R. LAWs ANN. §5192; P. R. Civ. CODE art. 1822.
77 See 469 F. Supp. at 140-41.
78 See P. R. CIv. CODE art. 1822.
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terms, applied not only to common law leases but also to leases under
Puerto Rican civil law.79
The district court turned to the Supreme Court of Puerto Rico for
guidance and quoted a case dealing with credit cards 0 which recognized
the difficulties of resisting the temptation to adopt American common law
developments in the fact of the civil law:
Forcing new institutions or even merely new usages of familiar institu-
tions into ancient frameworks is a task, nevertheless, that is never free of
dangers. Not everything is found nor should be found in the desired de-
gree of detail in the Code, which sometimes derives its vitality and ca-
pacity to adapt to changing realities more by reason of its great silences
and general formulations than by its detailed principles.'"
Furthermore, the lease-license distinction so useful in discussing the lease
agreement in the common law is entirely inapplicable in the civil law.82
The entire concept of license in Puerto Rico, as derived from the Spanish
licencia bears little resemblance to that of the common law.83
Despite the possible analogy to typical American department store
leases the court chose to carefully and deferentially analyze the civil law's
position. Before driving the proverbial nail in the creditor's coffin by find-
ing there was no fixed price necessary for a lease under Puerto Rican law,
the Court noted yet another difference with the common law. Unlike the
common law, the civil law allows that a leased item not be entirely de-
fined." Here the creditor had not leased a piece of real property, but
rather had contracted for the use of certain departments within the store.
Fernandez-Cerra v. Commercial Insurance Co. of Newark" provides
an example of deference to the civil law in a family-property law context.
This tort case was dismissed for lack of complete diversity necessary for
jurisdiction." The central issue was whether the defendant's wife should
be considered for purposes of diversity. Her addition to the suit would
destroy diversity.
The Court, typically, first looked to the positive law as embodied in
the Code. It found that, under Puerto Rican law, a new entity is created
upon marriage.87 Also, except in rare cases, the husband is the adminis-
79 469 F. Supp. at 146.
Id. (Quoting Santiago v. Sears Roebuck, 102 D.P.R. 515 (1974)).
469 F. Supp. at 146.
82 Id.
8 Id. The decision contains a detailed discussion of the precise meaning of "licencia."
" Id. at 148.
344 F. Supp. 314 (D.P.R. 1972).
"Id.
17 Id. at 316. (construing 31 P. R. LAws ANN. §§3622, 3641, 3661).
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trator of the conjugal relationship and is also its legal representative."8
Since it is the citizenship of the "real party in interest" which is scruti-
nized for diversity jurisdiction,89 the Court inquired into the nature of the
husband-wife relationship under the Civil Code. It found that:
[Tihe character of his administration and representation could be de-
scribed as being similar to that of a managing partner in a commercial
partnership, in which case there is little doubt that the real party in in-
terest is the partnership and not the partner."
This being the case, the citizenship of the partnership would be con-
sidered as an unincorporated association which would have the citizen-
ship of its members.' 1
The Court, however, did not stop here. It considered the possibility
of using an analogy from Texas law because there appeared to be no Pu-
erto Rican cases precisely on point. But the concepts of community prop-
erty in Texas and conjugal partnership proved incompatible.'2 Texas law
gives to the husband the interest for diversity purposes.' 3 In rejecting this
possible analogy, the Court quoted from another case critical of a decision
which had engaged in such an analogy.
Keeping in mind the historical and juridical origin of the concept of
property in the Anglo-American law of feudal origin and of the concept
of property in the civil law of Roman origin, one realizes that that was
not the way to solve a problem of interpretation and application of the
Civil Code. It would have been more proper, since an institution of civil
law is involved, to seek enlightenment in the continental European civil
doctrine and case law.' 4
Thus, the Court's unsympathetic attitude towards common law anal-
ogy is again reflected when these analogies contradict accepted civil law
doctrine. Here the doctrine being threatened was the accepted interpreta-
tion of the conjugal relationship.
B. Use of Decisions in Another Civil Law Jurisdiction: Louisiana"
As noted in Part III, the civil law system in Louisiina has been influ-
344 F. Supp. at 316. (construing 31 P. R. LAWS ANN., 284, 286, 3671).
19 See 3A MooRE's FEDERAL PRAcTICE DIGEST § or 17.04 (J. Moore ed. 1979).
90 344 F. Supp. at 317.
'4 See United Steelworkers of America v. R. H. Bouliguy, 382 U.S. 145 (1965).
92 344 F. Supp. at 318.
90 Id.
' Id. at 318 (quoting Robles V. Ostolaza, 96 P.R.R. 570, 577 (1968)).
95 See Diaz v. Montaner y Lizama, 248 F. Supp. 153, 157-58 (D.P.R. 1965), where the
Court utilized a U.S. Court interpretation of a similar Louisiana rule at issue in the case to
bolster its position; Wong v. Key Finance Corp. 266 F. Supp. 149, 154-55 (D.P.R. 1967),
Vol. 13:231
HANDLING OF DIVERSITY CASES
ential in Puerto Rico since the Foraker Act. Torresv. Interstate Fire and
Casualty Company6 was a tort case which illustrates how judicial deci-
sion making in Louisiana holds precedential value for Puerto Rican
courts.
The issue in Torres was whether the defense of limitation of liability
was a defense personal to the shipowner, or a non-personal defense also
available to a shipowner's insurer. After noting the paucity of decisions in
this area of law, the court looked at cases from the United States District
Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana. The Louisiana court had con-
cluded that the defense was personal. The Puerto Rican District Court
noted the general tendency of the Supreme Court of Puerto Rico to hold
these defenses personal. 7 Finally, the Court found case lawos interpreting
the legislative history of the Puerto Rican direct action statute (the basis
for the cause of action in the instant case) as intending to bring it com-
pletely in line with the Louisiana statutory counterpart. 9 These three
findings convinced the court that the two civil law systems were in agree-
ment, and the Torres court held that the defense was personal to the
shipowner. The methodology employed in this case is not unlike that
which a strict common law court would employ.
C. Reconciliation: Some Use of the Common Law and Like Results
Carrillo v. Samaeit Westbulk'00 illustrates how an underlying policy
can reconcile two seemingly distinct laws. Here, the Court held against a
defendant's claim that the jury awards for a wrongful death action were
excessive because they included damages for loss of consortium and soci-
ety, grief and anguish. The federal maritime rights involved stemmed
from the Puerto Rico's Workmen's Accident Compensation Act.101 This
act incorporated the rights and remedies provided by the Civil Code of
Puerto Pico with regard to third party actions, which has no counterpart
in common law.""2 This Act is:
[An all-encompassing tort statute that serves as the basis for recovery
for all damage caused by negligence, intentional acts or violations of im-
where the Court examined similar articles in the Louisiana court to help arrive at a decision;
and Esquilon v. Waterman Steamship Corp., 196 F. Supp. 600 (D.P.R. 1961), where the
Court relied upon a federal appellate court's decision which was an appeal from a Louisiana
court in Louisiana.
"6 275 F. Supp. 784 (D.P.R. 1967).
91 Id. at 788.
96 Id. at 788, citing Trigo v. Travelers Ins. Co. (P.R.S. Ct., March 11, 1965).
99 275 F. Supp. at 788.
385 F. Supp. 119 (D.P.R. 1974), modified 513 F.2d 1214 (1st Cir. 1975).
101 Id. at 127, (construing 11 P. R. LAws ANN., §1 et seq.).
102 See 385 F. Supp. at 127.
1981
CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L.
posed obligations and which has been interpreted to include a wrongful
death remedy and survival type actions."'3
Nevertheless, after finding extensive case law support for the broad fault
concept embodied in this section, the Court noted that the admiralty law
and its humanitarian policy were compatible and coextensive with the
policy of the civil code. 1" For this and other precedential reasons, the
Court held that there was no problem of uniformity between the two and
that therefore it was not improper to award these damages.105
Cooperation de Seguros Multiples de Puerto Rico v. San Juan1" is
an example in agency law of the court showing considerable deference to
common law principles. The issue presented was whether lack of knowl-
edge or consent by a principal of the tortious acts of his agent, consti-
tuted, as a matter of law, a defense to the relief claimed. 107 Although the
court notes the broader liability of the defendant under Puerto Rican law
as derived from civil law doctrine,108 it did not stop there in its analysis of
the law. Instead it chose to lay out the rule under the common law ap-
proach and to show how the defendant would be liable under either sys-
tem. In fact, the test for liability as stated by the Supreme Court of Pu-
erto Rico was derived primarily from the Restatement of the Law of
Agency §230.1"
Insight into the relative position of contract law in common law, and
obligations in civil law may be found in Felix A. Rodriguez, v. Bristol-
Myers Co.110 Essentially, the issue involved the possible imposition of
specific performance. But specific performance must meet different stan-
dards under the two systems. At civil law, the fact that a'plaintiff alleges
a breach of contract for which there is an adequate remedy at law does
not preclude him from seeking specific performance."' Thus the only lim-
its under this system are whether the imposition is possible and
conscionable."'
The mechanics of the civil law, however, are such that in the instant
case, specific performance was denied as it would have been under com-
mon law. Obligation, in the civil law, can be broken down into two catego-
103 Id. at 127-28.
104 Id. at 128.
105 Id.
10 288 F. Supp. 136 (D.P.R. 1968).
107 Id. at 138.
108 Id.
1o' Id. For an example of how the Puerto Rican Supreme Court has used this section,
see Gonzilez v. Compafia Agricola, 76 P.R.R. 373, 376 (1954).
110 281 F. Supp. 643 (D.P.R. 1968).
'Id. at 646.
112 Id.
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ries: (1) to give and (2) to do or abstain,1 with the latter subject to an
exception. That exception relates to the personal nature of the "doing."
Because this was such a case where the doing was of a personal nature,
specific performance was denied. The Court's decision immediately
pointed out that a similar result could be reached under the common law
because of the difficulty of performance arising out of the personal nature
of the contractual obligations. 14 Thus, although structurally differenct,
the two systems would yield similar results.
D. Adoption and Harmonization
Civil and common law concepts were harmonized in Gondlez v. Fire-
man's Ins. Co.115 The case dealt with the extent of recovery by a wife for
injuries to her husband. The defendant contended that since a husband
has a legal duty to support his wife, the wife should not be entitled to
damages for loss of consortium, companionship and affection once there
has been a recovery for his injuries."" The Court accepted the plaintiff's
proposition that the issue was one of harmonization of the two systems
when it noted that loss of consortium was clearly recognized in common
law:
[T]he civil law, when it talks of the anxiety and distress of a wife wit-
nessing her husband's sufferings, it means what the common law means
when it speaks of loss of consortium. Accordingly, under such a caption,
the wife would be getting compensation for her anxiety and distress
caused by witnessing her husband's suffering; item of damages clearly
recognized under the law of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico.1 17
Thus, when it is merely the captions or labels which are disparate in the
two systems, the court will look to the true nature of the claim to harmo-
nize them.
Pierluisis v. E.R. Squibb & Sons, Inc.11 offers an example of where
the common law completely fills a gap in the civil law. In this case, the
codefendant drug company was sued for negligence for failing to meet the
standard of care with respect to a duty to warn. The plaintiff argued that
the alleged duty included a written warning in Spanish on the drug label
itself when marketed in Puerto Rico. The defendant insisted that this
alleged duty was overly expensive and that the duty was discharged since
the drug company had made it clear to the medical profession what the
113 Id.
114 Id. at 647.
" 385 F. Supp. 140 (D.P.R. 1974).
" Id. at 144.
"' Id. See also Sea-Land Services v. Gaudet, 414 U.S. 573 (1974).
" 440 F. Supp. 691 (D.P.R. 1977).
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potential risks of using the drug were.
This was a case of first impression, and the Court began by stating
that:
[e]ven though common law precedents are not obligatory on Puerto Rico
courts the Supreme Court of Puerto Rico has repeatedly held that such
common law can be utilized by Commonwealth courts when it is found to
be useful and persuasive."'
Thus free to examine common law precedents, the Court found the gen-
eral rule to be that "the duty of adequate warning by the manufacturer of
an ethical drug is discharged by its warning of hazards to doctors. 120 Ap-
plying this rule to the facts of the instant case, the Court held that this
warning had been brought home to the doctor by the actions of the drug
company and that the "fact that they were in the English language was a
non-contributory irrelevant circumstance within the setting of the undis-
puted facts of this case."'21 Therefore, without the existence of any duty
to warn the general public, the drug company had adequately met its
duty of care. But again, this is a strictly common law result imposed by
the Court.
V. PROSPECTS FOR CIVIL LAW AND THE FEDERAL DISTRICT COURT IN
PUERTO RICO
The unique Commonwealth status of Puerto Rico has made the Dis-
trict Court, perhaps the most controversial of the federal district courts.
The scope of its jurisdiction is inextricably tied to fundamental political
questions on the Island. The demand for increased autonomy cannot help
but put increased pressures on the District Court and on the Congress to
become more responsive to the needs of the Island.
The Solicitor General of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, speaking
before the States Commission of the House of Representatives, made
three specific recommendations in the interest of modifying the scope of
the federal judiciary so as to guarantee true internal self government:
A. The United States District Court for Puerto Rico, unless it finds that
'the interest of justice otherwise requires, should abstain from exercising
jurisdiction in civil actions based upon alleged acts or failures to act by
officials of Puerto Rico pending final decisions by the Courts of Puerto
Rico.
B. All statutes and provisions which limit the jurisdiction of the federal
district courts in the United States should specifically be made applica-
ble to the Federal District Court in Puerto Rico.
" Id. at 694.
120 Id.
121 Id.
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C. All decrees or final judgments of federal courts of appeals holding
Puerto Rican statutes unconstitutional should be appealable right to the
Supreme Court of the United States. 2S
One can sense in each of these recommendations a suspicion that
there is a need for more deference to local laws. The latter reflects a clear
presumption that the U.S. Supreme Court is more deferential to the
Puerto Rican legislature than is the Court of Appeals.' s
With respect to the language problem unique to this federal court,
there is great pressure to introduce the Spanish language into the Court
under some workable plan in order to reflect the culture of the Island and
improve the mechanics of court procedure. Proposed reformation has
thus far not borne fruit.124 Nonetheless, from the proposals and their sup-
porting memoranda, it seems that some degree of recognition of Spanish
as an official language is crucial to an effective district court in Puerto
Rico."s5 Language is the tool of lawyers and denial of its use must inevita-
bly inhibit the ability of this Court to "do justice."
Underlying both the demands for modification of juridsictional rights
for the Court and admission of Spanish as an official language is the basic
contention that the District Court in Puerto Rico must reflect the needs
of Puerto Rican society in order to survive and serve a useful purpose to
the Commonwealth relationship. The political situation demands that the
U.S. institutions be sensitive to these local needs. Culturally, increased
nationalism has further entrenched the Spanish tradition and any
thought of a further melting pot Americanization of Puerto Rican society
is unrealistic. On the positive side, all judges currently sitting on the
bench are Puerto Rican and even commentaries which are critical of the
Court's present status do admit that the Court is generally regarded as
more forceful and progressive with respect to the protection of civil liber-
ties and constitutional rights than the Island's own court system.12e
122 Quoted in Naveira de Rod6n, Federal Court Jurisdiction and the State Commis-
sion, 39 Rav. C. Ano. P. R. 131, 137-38 (1978).
"2 In Fornaris v. Ridge Tool Co., 400 U.S. 41 at 42-43 (1970), the Court stated:
The relations of the federal courts to Puerto Rico have often raised delicate
problems. It is a Spanish-speaking Commonwealth with a set of laws still impreg-
nated with Spanish tradition. Federal courts, reversing Puerto Rican courts, were
inclined to construe Puerto Rican laws in the Anglo-Saxon tradition which often
left little room for the overtones of Spanish culture. Out of that experience grew a
pronouncement by this court that a Puerto Rican court should not be overruled
on its construction unless it could be said to be "inescapably wrong."
,24 For a historical look at the proposals and a critical evaluation of their similarities
and differences as well as the author's own proposed model, see Tschudin, supra note 8, at
63-86.
"s See Helfeld, Toward an Improved Compact of Association between Puerto Rico
and the United States, 38 Rav. C. Ano. P. R. 509, 521 (1977).
," See Tschudin, supra note 8 at 45. The District Court has also taken a more expan-
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VI. CONCLUSION
Several points should be made in turning to the future outlook for
the civil law system in Puerto Rico, especially as it relates to the District
Court. As a backdrop, the economic and political presence of the United
States cannot be ignored as forces exerting pressure towards "Americani-
zation" in general, and the use of common law specifically. Statistically,
however, references to the common law in diversity suits in the District
Court are relatively rare. The depth of the Spanish culture in Puerto Rico
will not allow the base of the civil law to weaken appreciably. Although
the political status of Puerto Rico will always be crucial in determining
the extent of American influence, it will not be decisive. The case of Loui-
siana is prima facie evidence of this. Therefore, there is no reason to be-
lieve that the civil law will soon cease to be the dominant legal force on
the Island.
The real question seems to be which system will provide more flex-
ibility. The apparent choices are (a) the present system with "equity"
gap-filling in the civil sense or (b) growing reliance on common law analo-
gies and authority. The most likely trend is a hybrid of these two with
primary reliance on the former. In any event, with other pressures being
exerted on the Federal District Court, it seems that any move away from
this model toward option (b) would have to be made by the insular court
system. The growing deference towards Island institutions inevitably in-
cludes the preservation of the integrity of civil law in this forum.
sive approach to the constitutional right of Puerto Ricans as U.S. citizens than has the U.S.
Supreme Court. See generally Recent Decision, Harris v. Rosario, 12 CASE W. REs. J. INT'L
L. 641 (1980).
Vol. 13:231
